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debt collections financial planning

Humanising Debt Collections: A Fair Practices Code For ARCs

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Humanising Debt Collections – A Fair Practices Code For ARCs

While the depiction of the Indian stressed asset market is often painted to look dismal, global globalization has put the screws on government and regulators to take decisive action. In a similar vein, India’s bad debt headache was alleviated with the inception of the SARFAESI Act, allowing banks to recover monies without judicial intervention. Despite that, the problem of mounting non-performing assets grew multi-fold thereby enhancing the prominence and aggression of Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARC) in financial circles.

Need for Fair Practice Codes

In wake of the mounting NPAs, the banking sector is under immense pressure to get its house in order. Realizing this, banks resorted to offloading bad debts from their loan books onto ARCs thereby leading to a massive reduction in their distressed assets. However, during this exercise banks made no provisions for these bad loans in their books, and bore no losses in case of defaults. This issue led to the intervention by RBI in form of the Fair Practice Code to ensure transparency in form of cash transactions.

Maintaining Transparency

Another reason for the need for the Code was that the sale of assets conducted by ARCs-in spirit-emerged to be no different from the sale of assets by state finance corporations or others vested with similar special powers of recovery. There have been many instances wherein ARCs sold assets through ‘private auctions’, and simply served a notice to the borrower. In this procedure, no account of the sale proceeds, description of the buyer or competing bidders, information on how the asset was sold, or expenses on the sale was provided to borrowers.

At this juncture, the RBIs notification will ensure transparent and non-discriminatory practices in terms of the acquisition of assets. To curb the issues and unclear process of assets being sold to bidders where there is no trace of information of who these individuals are, the invitation to participate in the auction will be made public.

This will also provide transparency in the way how many assets were being sold. The Boards involvement to make sure these rules are being held up is of utmost importance. When dealing with buyers Section 29A of the IBC must guide the process. The inclusion of Section 29A rendered persons contributing to defaults of the corporate debtor or other incapacities or are a related party, declares such parties as ineligible for submission of resolution plan and thereby preventing such persons from gaining control of the corporate debtor under the Code.

Simply put, the provision safeguards creditors of the company against unscrupulous persons whose aim is not a revival of the corporate debtor, but to reward themselves by undermining the objective of the Code. 

Thus, the notification aims to address issues of transparency and borrowers being kept in the dark during such sale of assets while keeping a check on the aggressive sale of assets by the banks and easy purchase by the ARCs. On contrarian grounds, FPC under the new regime would inadvertently restrict the enforcement action taken by ARCs.

Maintaining the spirits of Section 29A of the IBC or delving into investor control diminishes the powers conferred upon the ARC drastically. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that a regulatory directive from the central bank perhaps cannot have an overriding effect on legislations enacted to facilitate debt recovery, under the SARFAESI Act or the RDDB Act. 

Also, the sale of assets was not transparent and was far too commonly done at prices that do not represent fair values. Thus, these malpractices by the ARCs forced the RBI to come up with Fair Practice Codes to ensure transparency in transactions and keep a check on their practices. Under the notification, ARCs are entitled to release all securities on the repayment of dues.

If the right of set-off is exercised, then a notice to the buyer must be sent with information regarding the full particulars of the remaining claim and the conditions under which ARCs are entitled to retain the securities till the relevant claim is settled or paid.

Ethical Recovery Processes

Hereafter, ARCs must ensure adequate training to staff to deal with customer matters appropriately. This will prevent or mitigate unlawful and uncivilized harassment inflicted upon debtors in the name of debt recovery processes. In the spirit of this Code, ARCsmust establishes a code of conduct for Recovery Agents and also holds the company accountable in case of breaches by their Agents.

A compulsory set up of a proper Grievance Redressal within the company should be constituted by ARC. The officer’s name designated for that redressal must be mentioned during the process. Such machinery will prove to be a step towards settlement of issues subsisting between the ARCs and the borrowers or the banks.

In addition to this, initiatives to address the absence of a poor secondary market have been taken up. In the intention to outsource an activity, a suitable outsourcing policy needs to be established, a delegation of authority depending on risks and materiality, and systems to monitor and review the operations of these activities.

Conclusion 

Overall, the RBI’s guidelines reward assertive steps yet ethical recovery practices are strides in the right direction. This move will rationalize recent trends in the industry and prove advantageous to various stakeholders in the stressed asset sector, including defaulting borrowers. In light of the new guidelines, ARCs are likely to change their bidding strategy and cherry-pick deals backed by ‘hard’ assets reducing the number of deals.

At the heart of the ‘Fair Practices Code guidelines is the protection of debtors by humanizing the recovery process while striking an optimum balance between lender-borrower interests in the recovery framework. With an emphasis on compliances, transparent and non-discriminatory practices in the acquisition of assets, and the required release of securities upon repayment of dues, the FPC guidelines may collectively help insulate debtors from the clutches of the sale process.

Adherence to these guidelines will place these bad bank sponges on a game-changing pathway leading to reduced NPAs thereby reviving stressed assets in the banking sector and the Indian economy one step at a time, however not without some enforcement hiccups. 

 


Tags: fair practices, arc code, the debt collector, debt collections, commercial debt collection, credit collection services, debt recovery, debt management and collections system, debt collection services, commercial debt, credit collection

rbi monetary policy, hfc lending

RBI Monetary Policy Committee: A Pathway towards Normalcy?

By Economy, Banking, Others No Comments

RBI’s Monetary Policy Committee

Sluggish growth, increasing vulnerability of financial institutions, mounting NPAs, non-convergence working between financial and real sectors, and poor monetary transmission continue to haunt the economy despite the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) intensive financial stability measures. With financial and monetary stability being RBI’s core objective, the apex bank is geared towards the restoration of equilibrium in these unprecedented times.

The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of RBI announced that interest rates would remain unchanged thereby taking an accommodative stance towards its policies. Amid the recent inflation in retail consumer prices, RBI also said that it would ensure that this rise in inflation remains within its targets and control. The repo rate currently stands at 4.0% and the reverse repo rate at 3.35%.

The decision indicates that MPC would monitor dynamics for a durable reduction in inflation before the policy rates are lowered again and patiently await to use its remaining monetary ammunition. On the surface, this appears to have a balancing effect between financial stability and growth support in light of the current challenges posed by the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The existing disconnect between our economy and the financial market indicates that RBI would be watchful of the current inflation as well as the existing exuberance in the markets. RBI is now prioritizing strain felt by the economy and tackling the challenges to the growth of the economy with the containment of retail inflation.

Central Banks’ MPC could be seen as judicial in their approach, playing it safe while maintaining the status quo of the current rates with the scope of further monetary action even after this apparent pause. Current rates could be accommodating enough to allow for such a break without unwarranted consequences. It also allows them to monitor the existing risks associated with Food Inflation as well as the Cost-Push pressure due to fuel price rises.

MPCs’ approach was a cautious step showing concerns over the evolution of uncertain inflation trajectory while supporting the growth prospects that could be available as and when this trajectory allows. The decision to maintain this status quo could be based upon their short-term outlook towards inflation in the current uncertainty because of cost-push factors and existing supply constraints.

RBIs’ accommodating stance with the current backdrop of diminished growth and subsequent expectation of a reduction in inflation over a medium-term period puts the current policy in congruence with the current market expectations and provides them with further space for easing of monetary measures to revive the economic growth during COVID-19.

RBIs’ step towards allowing some form of restructuring facility to the banks facing trouble in restructuring the loans without classifying them as Non-Performing Assets (NPA), could be seen as a positive step that could further ease the stress on Banking systems.

This new resolution framework could be seen as an additional systematic undertaking to tackle the stress induced by the COVID-19 Pandemic. Additionally, RBI has also recognized the need for this facility for standard accounts facing difficulties while restructuring, and this facility has also been extended to SMEs, corporations, and personal loans providing each segment with proper & necessary safeguards.

Addressing the MSME sector, which has been deeply impacted by this Pandemic, the reasonably anticipated scheme for restructuring this sector could provide them with additional support & relief in this tumultuous time. Addressing the concern regarding liquidity in this Pandemic faced by MSME could facilitate an amended system and platform for the banks.

This restructuring of the loan scheme could be seen as a breather to already liquidity-strapped financial sectors, already facing concerns over the asset quality issue. An expert committee under KV Kamath could overlook and provide recommendations regarding the scheme’s details and restructuring plans. This could give the MSME, companies as well as individuals better safeguard in this liquidity crisis during the Pandemic.

To improve the flow of credit and enhance liquidity additional measures were announced by RBI to accelerate the growth of the economy. RBI also focused on measures that could deepen the digital payment facilities among all others.

These announcements could harmonize market risk associated with capital charge treatment of investment by banks in debt instruments and ETFs as well as Debt Mutual Funds and prediction for improvement in the bond market, as there could be higher participation by banks in the bond markets over a while.

Additionally, a measure relating to increasing the sanctioned loan to value ratio (LTV) for gold loans to 90 percent by March 31, 2021, is an effort to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on households at a micro-economic level however this move fails to soothe deeper wounds aggravated on account of the virus-induced financial distress.

Additional liquidity facilities provided to NABARD and NHB will further support the credit push in the economy. RBI has continued to focus on also bringing down borrowing costs for all.

In light of India’s sluggish economic growth, uncertain external demand, and rising inflation, the developmental and regulatory measures announced by RBI adopts a prudent approach to upholding the current policy rates in existing circumstances.

Their strategy could be seen to be in perfect conformity with the currently developing state of the economy while keeping enough headroom for future changes. However, it remains to be seen how much relief will be provided, and what will be the take-up for this resolution mechanism.

 


Tags: rbi’s monetary policy, rbi monetary, bi monthly monetary policy, recent monetary policy of rbi, rbi monetary policy 2021, rbi monetary policy committee

balance sheet

Will our Balance Sheet Reflect a Picture Different From The Harsh Reality of Mounting NPA’s?

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Reflection of Balance Sheet

Circumstances such as the present pandemic have compelled the country and its business to pivot or risk being perished in this country-wide overhaul. The virus-induced lockdown has raised “Liquidity” and Non-Performing Assets (“NPA”) issues popularizing the buzzwords in financial circles and beyond.

Anticipating a domino effect on loan defaults amongst small to medium-sized businesses, the Finance Ministry in conjoined efforts with Regulators and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), introduced numerous measures for the maintenance of equilibrium between the market forces of demand and supply during the pandemic.

One of the preliminary measures taken by the Ministry was the suspension of Sections 7 and 9 of the IBC, followed by a moratorium on loan payments until August 31. While this move was appreciated by Corporate Borrowers at the outset, a closer look at the policies revealed deep financial woes in the long run.

Consequently, the embargo may pause the economic ripple effect on businesses for some time, but does not discount or waive off payment liabilities due to losses that occurred under the pretext of COVID-19; however the increase in threshold value to Rs. 1 crore for initiation of insolvency leaves out a massive chunk of small to medium businesses having debts lesser than 1 crore leaving them limited options of traditional litigation, which are time-consuming and expensive.

Further, relaxations in compliance requirements, an extension of the ITR filing deadline to November 30th along with deferred interest payments in relation to the loan moratorium are myopic and are likely to create issues in long term for all stakeholders. These measures are collectively aimed at keeping businesses afloat while testing the resilience of financial institutions by offering relaxations – a necessary cushion.

Loan-loss provisioning for NPAs as mandated by the newly introduced amendments has seriously eroded the capital base of several banks, limiting their ability to make further loans. There is general consensus that the state of Indian banking is among the biggest challenges facing the country in accelerating investments, growth, and sustainability. 

A cherry on the cake for defaulting Corporate Borrowers was last week’s Supreme Court’s ruling which stated that Default will not result in NPA until further orders. In view of this, the accounts which were not declared NPA till August 31 shall not be declared NPA till further orders.

RBI’s circular dated 27th March 2020 was considered to be ultra vires to the extent that it was charging interest on the loan amount and also charging interest on interest (compound interest) on the deferred loans during the moratorium period. In light of this,` all pertinent decisions cannot be left to individual banks and the Supreme Court stated that clarification on interest upon interest will have to be obtained.

The main purpose of the moratorium was to provide a sigh of relief to those in distress and not as a weapon or an opportunity for those already defaulting on payment of their loan amounts. This pandemic created hardships for the borrowers, especially individual borrowers, and also obstruction in “right to life” as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Also charging compounding interest during the moratorium period in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic had no merit as such as held by the apex court. 

Non-recognition of NPAs until the end of this year will certainly distort the harsh reality of mounting NPAs in the country and the increasing burden on financial institutions. With the shadow financing industry already struggling with funds in light of recent crises such as the IL&FS fiasco, COVID-19 has further jeopardized the survival of the sector at large. At this juncture, it is necessary to implement an all-encompassing framework supporting the demand and supply side of the economy so as to avoid any potential systemic risks to the financial sector and accordingly take corrective steps.

As the nation awaits orders from the apex court, there is a dire need for the RBI to develop better mechanisms for monitoring macro-prudential indicators, especially to watch out for credit bubbles. Over the medium term, a simple indicator would be a rate of credit growth that is way out of line with the trend rate of growth of credit or with the broad growth rate of the economy. This way, the economic ripple effects throughout the country can be traced and mitigated at the source to avoid further damage. 

The pandemic has drastically reduced the Indian GDP by 23 percent ruling out a waiver of interest on bank loans during the moratorium period for all borrowers providing a suggestion for long-term rescheduling. Any “ex post facto” change in terms and conditions of the moratorium favoring those who availed of it over those who made the extra effort of repaying would be grossly inequitable and patently unfair for those who did not avail of the benefits of the moratorium initially or gave it up subsequently.

With the scales of economic relief mostly tipped in favor of small-scale borrowers, it further paves way for banks to restructure loans. In fact, NBFCs have requested RBI to allow them one-time restructuring of all loans till March 2021, as their borrowers are facing funding issues amid the pandemic.

This is a preferred move for financial institutions as there won’t be any buyers in a cash-strapped economy, even if impacted companies are taken to bankruptcy courts. So it is wise of financial institutions to work out a restructuring package without calling for a change in ownership while allowing the loans to remain ‘standard’.

However, misuse of previous restructuring frameworks by promoters has made the RBI wary of approving any such rejig with existing promoters at the helm. Bankers are mindful that any proposal has to have strong checks and balances to ensure it is not misused.

Despite these measures, a formidable overhand of NPAs may linger long after the COVID-19 pandemic dust is settled. Restructuring of loans is a static relief formula and may derail the debt rehabilitation process. Subsequently, this shall defer NPA recognition, as it did a few years ago, however restructuring may rose tint balance sheets for a few months but the risk of an impending credit bubble burst is a high possibility of a custom policy to sustain the economy is not implemented in a timely manner. 

 


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central banking framework, economic slowdown

Limitations to The Central Banking Framework Amidst The Pandemic

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Limitations to The Central Banking Framework

Now, more than ever, central banks are focused on risk. And, as COVID-19 evolves, they are increasingly recognizing that the rebuilding phase offers a unique opportunity to encourage action on the agenda of survival until the COVID-19 dust settles. The acute phase of COVID-19 has drawn central banks’ attention towards a crisis that was earlier restricted to some states and regions, to a global economic crisis riddled with challenges.

The nature of the crisis has revealed basic vulnerabilities around the world, which are a combination of debt and leverage, intra- financial multiplication and securitization, pathological structural developments in individual economies, and unsustainable asymmetries in global capital accumulation, creating imbalances in trade, investment, and consumption dynamics. 

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), along with the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has been taking a series of measures over the past few months to cope with an economic slowdown and address the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Their actions, though guided by multiple considerations such as inflation and growth management, debt and currency management, have exposed the limitations and contradictions in the central banking framework in India.

The monetary policy laid down by the RBI involves the management of money supply and interest rates. The primary objective of the monetary policy is to maintain price stability while keeping growth in mind. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Act, 1934, was amended in May 2016 to provide a statutory basis for the implementation of a flexible inflation targeting framework. 

The monetary policy committee in their current monetary policy is guided to maintain an inflation rate of 4 plus/minus 2 percent. The main concern that arises is if the MPC should be working on the growth considerations or the short-term inflation concerns. Since February last year, the monetary policy committee has attached primacy to reviving the growth and lowering the benchmark repo rate.

However, in the recent August policy, the MPC decided to maintain the status quo. This decision was driven due to the elevated inflation rates which continue to average above the inflation-targeting framework.

There is no doubt that there is considerable uncertainty over the trajectory of inflation. The current inflation is majority driven by the supply chain dislocations owing to the lockdowns. There is uncertainty if Covid-19 will be inflationary in the short-run or will it be deflationary in the medium-term due to the falling demand or will it remain inflationary in the medium-term due to the supply disruptions overweighing the fall in demand.

The current inflation is also a result of the evident growing disconnect between the wholesale price index (WPI) and consumer price index (CPI). Since April this year, the WPI has been declining whereas the CPI has elevated, which indicates that there is excess supply and low demand on the wholesale level but excess demand and low supply on the consumer level. This implies that the rise in retail inflation will be short term and it will begin to lower as the disruptions diminish.

The refusal to provide any firm projection of future inflation is also a concern. The MPC’s mandate is to deliver stable inflation over a long period of time and not just a few months. However, it appears as if it is more concerned about elevated inflation in the short run.

We can argue about the inefficacy of the monetary policy and the limited options before the committee but is this argument is more driven by the absence of policy levers available to the committee other than the repo rate. While there is considerable uncertainty over the economic conditions but surely the committee is basing their decisions on certain future economic expectations. These should be made available to the public.

RBI Governor Shakuntala Das, in an event, said, “Monetary policy has its own limits. Structural reforms and fiscal measures may have to be continued and further activated to provide a durable push and boost growth.” He also added that one of the major challenges for the central banks is the assessment of the current economic situation and that the precise estimation of key parameters such as potential output and precise output gaps on a real-time basis is a challenging task, although they are crucial for the conduct of the monetary policy.  

Various inherent contradictions between the MPC’s operations and RBI’s management functions have also been brought forward due to this economic crisis. The Reserve Bank of India is responsible for the smooth functioning of the government’s borrowing program.

The RBI has taken up various interventions known as Operation twist, which involves buying longer-dated government bonds while simultaneously selling shorter-dated securities of an equivalent amount, pushing down long-term government security yields, and exerting upward pressure on short-term yields. This created a contradiction between MPC and RBI as in doing so, the RBI ended up doing the exact opposite of what MPC was trying to achieve by cutting short-term rates.

Another contradiction arose when RBI started intervening in the currency market to prevent the rupee from appreciating which constrained its ability to conduct open market operations to increase the liquidity injections into the economy.

At the one end, the central bank is bound to an inflation target. Yet, at this juncture, there is a strong argument to look past the current spurt in inflation and test the limits of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy. On the other end, while it may want to intervene to prevent the rupee’s appreciation, in doing so, its debt management functions have run up against its currency management functions. 

A growing number of central banks and banking supervisors are starting to work together to progress a global approach and agenda. In doing so, the central banks need to develop a clear strategy for the way forward. A monetary policy needs to be forward-looking. Given the slowdown in the economy and that the transmission of rate cuts takes time, there is a need for further monetary policy easing.

This will also be helpful as uncertainty remains over COVID-19 having a deflationary or inflationary impact on the Indian economy in the medium run. While the temptation to adopt aggressive measures may be high, crossing the traditional boundaries between fiscal and monetary policies, but are feasible for central banks in advanced economies with high credibility stemming from a long track record of stability-oriented policies. Thus this strong medicine should only be taken with extreme care.

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Tags: limitations to the central, limitations to the central banking framework, central banking framework, central bank framework amidst the pandemic, central bank framework

consolidation in banking sector

An Analysis of Consolidation in Banking Sector in India

By Banking No Comments

Consolidation in Banking Sector in India

“The Indian banking system could be better off if some public sector banks are consolidated to have fewer but healthier entities, as it would help in dealing with the problem of stressed assets”.
– Urjit Patel, Former RBI Governor

Recently, the 93-year-old lender, Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB) made it to the list of recent financial sector failures. After several quarters of waning financials, the lender was placed under a moratorium and is set to be merged with DBS Bank India. While bank failures are not a novel occurrence, the material size and quick succession of financial institutions going under the bus are worrisome.

In the past few years, investors have witnessed the failure of IL&FS, DHFL, Yes Bank, PMC Bank, and now Lakshmi Vilas Bank. IDBI Bank, was on the brink of a collapse by Life Insurance Corporation’s (LIC) capital infusion, thereby taking over a majority stake in the bank. While IDBI Bank’s case maybe is inconsequential in size as compared to India’s financial sector but bank failures, put together, throw up some important lessons for the Reserve Bank of India and the country’s financial sector at large.

While there exist two types of bank consolidations – voluntary and forced, the latter is widely prevalent across continents. Globally, the prime driving force for voluntary bank consolidation activity is a stiff competition that puts focus on synergy, growth and operational efficiency, and profitability. The merger of ING Vysya Bank, having a strong presence in South India, with Kotak Mahindra Bank having a stronghold across West and North India driven by synergy and demonstrated clear economic logic.

However, the latter type of bank consolidation is viewed from the perspective of the resolution of a weak bank and the “too big to fail” principle followed by the authorities. As a result, such mergers and acquisitions have facilitated corporate restructuring leading to the emergence of large banking and non-banking financial institutions both in – size and might. 

Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 empowers the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to make a scheme of reconstruction or amalgamation of a bank with another bank if it is in the depositors’ interest or in the public interest, or in the interest of the banking system as a whole. The operation of the weak bank may be kept under a moratorium for a certain period of time to ensure smooth implementation of the scheme.

Many private sector banks have been merged with other private sector banks or the PSBs under this mechanism. The recently forced matrimony between the Indian arm of the Singapore lender, DBS, and Lakshmi Vilas Bank is a salient example of the applicability of this provision since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Resultantly, LVB will cease to exist and its deposits will appear on the books of the India unit of DBS Group Holdings Ltd., Singapore’s biggest bank.

In hindsight, this approach is a cleaner solution as opposed to the handling of the Punjab & Maharashtra Co-operative Bank Ltd. (PMC) implosion, whose loan book was associated with a bankrupt developer, and more than a year later, the larger PMC depositors remain trapped under RBI’s orders. In another instance of a messy bailout, authorities permanently wrote down $1.2 billion of Yes Bank’s liabilities, wherein the complete loss was borne by Tier 1 bondholders and relied upon State Bank of India for capital infusion.

Such past instances are indicative of the authorities’ past refusal to give a decent burial to a failed institution. However, regulations and notifications passed on account of COVID-19 provide for a convenient regulatory cover to delay recognition of stressed assets, and therefore, the success of such bank consolidations may not be known until March 2022.

Banks as a whole have exhibited sluggish performance followed by an increase in Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in recent years. As a result, such consolidation or merger of financial institutions can help them ride off troughs with relative ease and bring Indian banks into competition with global banking giants. In the case of DBS-LVB, DBS being Singapore’s largest lender is well-capitalized and has deeper expertise to handle large credits and large NPA, provided the consolidation is well-calibrated and based on sound economic logic.

On the flip side, the merger of a weak bank (here, LVB) with a strong bank (here, DBS) may lead to a weaker merged entity in the event the merger process is handled inadequately. Issues inflicting the weaker bank such as higher NPAs and capital shortages may get transmitted to the stronger banks due to unduly haste or a mechanical merger process. Moreover, the existence of large-sized stressed banks may lead to systemic implications as the governments almost always bail out banks that are “too big to fail” using taxpayers’ monies.

Finally, in view of the above, the RBI must act preemptively when a financial institution has weakened beyond repair. For instance, in the case of Lakshmi Vilas Bank, its books revealed the need for a rescue for over a year, however; the institution was left high and dry to the point of complete capital erosion.

Therefore, the RBI’s decision to broaden the search beyond a “national team” is a good sign and indicates that the regulator wants control of banking assets to be in strong hands. While such forced mergers may be detrimental to the wealth of bidder banks, time shall reveal whether the DBS-LVB merger is fair and equitable to both banks involved in the merger. 

 


Tags: consolidation in the banking industry, consolidation in the banking sector, consolidation in banking sector, banking sector consolidation, financial sector failures

bank nationalization

A Robust Shadow Banking System For NBFCs – A Must For The Indian Economy Having a High Quantum of Micro Borrowers

By Economy, Banking No Comments

NBFC Micro Finance Institutions

Customers for micro-entrepreneurs have dwindled. With this significant loss of demand coupled with the supply-side shock, most cannot ply their trades with any significant level of certainty and consistency. With overburdened banks and a substantial non-performing asset portfolio, the shadow financing industry’s inclination is to percolate downwards leading to a wider reach among the economically weaker sections of the society across India. In addition to this, the limited prudential regulation pertaining to NBFCs further attracted a high quantum of micro borrowers in India looking to pave their way out of the pandemic situation. 

In the past, the interests of micro-borrowers were compromised in the single-minded pursuit of increased profits by lenders with a scarce focus on the well-being of borrowers. To address this problem the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), 2011, introduced comprehensive regulations on micro-credit with “master directions” for NBFC Micro Finance Institutions, which covered products, leverage limits, market segments, pricing, and the interface with customers.

However, the potential effect of similar such comprehensive regulations was wiped off with the onset of the pandemic hurling a substantial population of micro-borrowers into a fathomless abyss of debt and penal interests. In addition to this, the recent government-led relaxations have induced a lopsided effect of pushing the demand side upward while the industry continues to be plagued with disrupted supply chains and the unavailability of the labor force.

With the attainment of demand-supply equilibrium appearing as a distant reality, the resilience of the shadow financing industry will be put to a litmus test. Therefore, safeguarding customer interests is as critical as helping the shadow financing system stay afloat when depressionary forces are mightiest. 

Adding to the woes of NBFCs is the lack of fund flow and evaporating liquidity which started from the IL&FS fiasco but continues to exacerbate under the pretext of the pandemic. For the lack of government support in this year’s Budget, the involvement of NBFCs in sensitive sectors such as real estate and infrastructure has led these shadow banking segments to gorge on public money. Evidently, the cash influx from the authorities is not sufficient to eliminate concerns among investors about NBFCs and raises concerns of rising bad debts in the coming quarters. 

The past few years have severely impacted the financial well-being of the shadow financing industry; however, they have gained a position of prominence by assuming the role of banks on some occasions.  This invariably raises an essential question of whether to bring NBFCs under similar scrutiny levels as banks to ensure the sustainability of NBFCs. The need for a strongly regulated shadow banking system was urgently felt to be addressed by the RBI to address the systemic risks inherent to NBFC in the country.

The proposal to place micro-borrowers under the least stringent regulations is likely to facilitate growth and promote the shadow financing industry which plays an integral role in lending support to micro borrowers in rural and urban areas. However, in doing so, the loss withstanding ability of various classes of NBFCs should be carefully assessed.

Since NBFCs attract a high quantum of borrowers, a robust system would enable the NBFCs to assign credit scores to individuals. Thus, propelling the existing framework towards a fool-proof one would mitigate default risks that caused the collapse of the sector in the past. As NBFCs operate more like banks and provide similar banking services at present, the current practice demands a stricter regulation on the NBFCs wherein checks and balances at regular intervals would ensure the overall financial health while securing the interests of micro-borrowers at large.

 


Tags: rbi guidelines for microfinance, nbfc microfinance, micro finance rbi guidelines, micro finance nbfc, nbfc micro finance institutions, rbi rules for microfinance, rbi guidelines for microfinance institutions, rbi guidelines microfinance

china's bad bank geometry

Lessons From China Bad Bank Geometry and How India Can Learn

By Banking, Others No Comments

Lessons From China Bad Bank Geometry

The NPA crisis in India is burgeoning. While the RBI and Government take steps to strengthen the hands of bankers in the recovery and rehabilitation of stressed assets, the impact of these measures will be visible after a time. To worsen the state of the financial sector in India, the increasing failure of banks due to their operational issues coupled with pandemics can quite rightly be stated as a recipe for disaster. In its newest initiative to deal with the financial crisis in the country, India has been getting ready to operationalize a new scheme- Bad Banks.

Starting an aspiring scheme to mitigate the crisis, a little perspective and scrutinization of similar successful policies in other nations might be necessary, even if it is coming from the territorial aggressor – China. India can effectively scrutinize the Chinese experience which should inform Indian policy on bad banks.

The aftermath of the Asian financial crisis was a setback for many economies around the world. Its effect on the Indian financial system was so immense that many consider the Asian financial crisis as the origin of the NPA crisis in India.

Even though India, at that time, might have swept the problem under the carpet but China had set up dedicated bad banks for each of its big four state-owned commercial banks. As a mandatory function of bad banks, they acquired non-performing loans from debilitating, stressed banks and timely resolved them.

Given the global financial crisis of 2008, their tenure was extended indefinitely. Deciphering the success of such a strategy, in 2012, China had emphatically permitted the establishment of one local bad bank per province.

The strategy of bad banks to counter their bad loans was utilized to such an extent that by the end of 2019, China had 59 local bad banks. Such a conscious, timely approach to mitigate the NPA crisis in China can serve as an opportune example for India, which at the moment, stares at a long, never-ending path of NPA crisis.

According to various researches, it is to be noted that Chinese bad banks have been hailed for their notable contribution to concealing bad loans. According to reports, banks finance over 90 percent of non-performing loans. 

The mechanism

China’s bad bank strategy works on bad banks reselling over 70 percent of the NPLs at inflated prices to third parties. Additionally, it is to be noted that the third party usually happens to be borrowers of the same banks. However, all is not as rosy as many reports might state. This is due to the fact that there are a plethora of reports that are there, on the contrary, maintain that in the presence of binding financial regulations, the bad bank model could create perverse incentives to hide bad loans instead of resolving them.

The lessons India should pay head to

The Chinese bad bank’s experience teaches India four important lessons. First and foremost, the tenure of bad banks is the key. This effectively means that a bad bank should ideally have a finite tenure. This is due to a very prominent reason that bad banks are typically a swift response to an abrupt economic shock which can lead to quick, orderly disposal of bad loans. However, it does not leave much space for long-term restructuring and in-depth resolution. Thus clearly, such a bad bank has a temporary purpose.

The second lesson to be learned from China’s bad bank experience is that a bad bank must have a narrow mandate with clearly defined goals. It is to be noted that mere transferring of bad loans to bad banks isn’t the ultimate solution but a full-fledged, in-depth resolution strategy is required to mitigate such a crisis.

If such a mechanism is not paid heed to, a Bad bank scheme might become a vicious non-ending cycle of transferring bad loans to a third party. As a matter of fact, overdependence on bad banks might even lead to financial instability in the long run.

Thirdly, it is not news that the nature of occurrence of NPAs and nonpayment of huge loans in India is recurrent even after they are transferred to asset reconstruction companies, also known as bad banks. Additionally, it is to be noted that sources of funds for ARCs have largely been bank-centric.

This effectively means that some banks also continue to hold close to 70 percent of the total security receipts (SRs). Thus, to address such an odious problem, RBI has tightened bank provisioning. This has been done by liberalizing foreign portfolio investment norms. This initiative has been taken to help reduce bank holding in SRs.

Lastly, the resolution of the NPAs in the economy should happen through a market mechanism and not through a multitude of bad banks. As a matter of fact, the regulatory arbitrage between ARCs and AIFs needs to end.
While AIFs should be effectively allowed to purchase bad loans directly from banks, ARCs on the other hand should be allowed to purchase stressed assets from insurance companies, bond investors, and mutual funds.

Thus, ARCs should be effectively trusted to be allowed to infuse fresh equity in distressed companies, within IBC or outside of it. Thus, given all the aforementioned experiences of the Chinese bad bank strategy, India might now have a clearer perspective on the road map it needs to take for a successful resolution of its bad bank crisis.

The Chinese experience should even nudge Indian policymakers to facilitate market-based mechanisms for bad loan resolution in a steady-state while avoiding excessive dependence on bad banks for its NPA resolution. Therefore, India must pick cues from its territorial aggressor and avoid creating a superstructure Bad Bank on an unworkable infrastructure!

 


Tags: china’s bad bank geometry, bad bank geometry china, bad banks, china bad bank geometry, china banks, lessons from china bad banks

Lessons From China’s Bad Banks Geometry and How India Can Learn

By Banking No Comments

China’s Bad Banks Geometry

The NPA crisis in India is burgeoning. While the RBI and Government take steps to strengthen the hands of bankers in the recovery and rehabilitation of stressed assets, the impact of these measures will be visible after a time. To worsen the state of the financial sector in India, the increasing failure of banks due to their operational issues coupled with pandemics can quite rightly be stated as a recipe for disaster. In its newest initiative to deal with the financial crisis in the country, India has been getting ready to operationalize a new scheme- Bad Banks.

Starting an aspiring scheme to mitigate the crisis, a little perspective and scrutinization of similar successful policies in other nations might be necessary, even if it is coming from the territorial aggressor – China. India can effectively scrutinize the Chinese experience which should inform Indian policy on bad banks.

The aftermath of the Asian financial crisis was a setback for many economies around the world. Its effect on the Indian financial system was so immense that many consider the Asian financial crisis as the origin of the NPA crisis in India. Even though India, at that time, might have swept the problem under the carpet but China had set up dedicated bad banks for each of its big four state-owned commercial banks. As a mandatory function of bad banks, they acquired non-performing loans from debilitating, stressed banks and timely resolved them.

Given the global financial crisis of 2008, their tenure was extended indefinitely. Deciphering the success of such a strategy, in 2012, China had emphatically permitted the establishment of one local bad bank per province. The strategy of bad banks to counter their bad loans was utilized to such an extent that by the end of 2019, China had 59 local bad banks.

Such a conscious, timely approach to mitigate the NPA crisis in China can serve as an opportune example for India, which at the moment, stares at a long, never-ending path of NPA crisis. According to various researches, it is to be noted that Chinese bad banks have been hailed for their notable contribution to concealing bad loans. According to reports, banks finance over 90 percent of non-performing loans. 

The mechanism

China’s bad bank strategy works on bad banks reselling over 70 percent of the NPLs at inflated prices to third parties. Additionally, it is to be noted that the third party usually happens to be borrowers of the same banks. However, all is not as rosy as many reports might state. This is due to the fact that there are a plethora of reports that are there, on the contrary, maintain that in the presence of binding financial regulations, the bad bank model could create perverse incentives to hide bad loans instead of resolving them.

The lessons India should pay head to

The Chinese bad bank’s experience teaches India four important lessons. First and foremost, the tenure of bad banks is the key. This effectively means that a bad bank should ideally have a finite tenure. This is due to a very prominent reason that bad banks are typically a swift response to an abrupt economic shock which can lead to quick, orderly disposal of bad loans. However, it does not leave much space for long-term restructuring and in-depth resolution. Thus clearly, such a bad bank has a temporary purpose.

The second lesson to be learned from China’s bad bank experience is that a bad bank must have a narrow mandate with clearly defined goals. It is to be noted that mere transferring of bad loans to bad banks isn’t the ultimate solution but a full-fledged, in-depth resolution strategy is required to mitigate such a crisis. If such a mechanism is not paid heed to, a Bad bank scheme might become a vicious non-ending cycle of transferring bad loans to a third party. As a matter of fact, overdependence on bad banks might even lead to financial instability in the long run.

Thirdly, it is not news that the nature of occurrence of NPAs and nonpayment of huge loans in India is recurrent even after they are transferred to asset reconstruction companies, also known as bad banks. Additionally, it is to be noted that sources of funds for ARCs have largely been bank-centric. This effectively means that some banks also continue to hold close to 70 percent of the total security receipts (SRs). Thus, to address such an odious problem, RBI has tightened bank provisioning. This has been done by liberalizing foreign portfolio investment norms. This initiative has been taken to help reduce bank holding in SRs.

Lastly, the resolution of the NPAs in the economy should happen through a market mechanism and not through a multitude of bad banks. As a matter of fact, the regulatory arbitrage between ARCs and AIFs needs to end.

While AIFs should be effectively allowed to purchase bad loans directly from banks, ARCs on the other hand should be allowed to purchase stressed assets from insurance companies, bond investors, and mutual funds. Thus, ARCs should be effectively trusted to be allowed to infuse fresh equity in distressed companies, within IBC or outside of it.

Thus, given all the aforementioned experiences of the Chinese bad bank strategy, India might now have a clearer perspective on the road map it needs to take for a successful resolution of its bad bank crisis. The Chinese experience should even nudge Indian policymakers to facilitate market-based mechanisms for bad loan resolution in a steady-state while avoiding excessive dependence on bad banks for its NPA resolution. Therefore, India must pick cues from its territorial aggressor and avoid creating a superstructure Bad Bank on an unworkable infrastructure!

 


china bad bank geometry, china’s bad bank geometry, bad bank geometry china, china banks, bad banks

amazon bank

What Would An Amazon Bank Look Like?

By Banking No Comments

Amazon Bank

Leading up to 2020, radically transformed Bank models have emerged. A glimpse ahead shows an emphasis on innovative technologies to vastly facilitate banking – inclusive banking through new types of Bank models, non-traditional alliances to make banking affordable, and Fintech capabilities to make banking customer-centric. Banking in the future will leverage the geographic reach and financial know-how of NBFCs by joining hands with Fintech companies disrupting services with AI, Blockchain, and cyber security tools.

Given the above, it wouldn’t be surprising if Amazon bank one day materialized into a robust conventional banking alternative. Though Amazon is not a bank but the prospects of it becoming one aren’t too bleak. Why do we think so? It is due to one of the eCommerce giant’s traits to boast about its banking attributes and services that it would like to offer its customers that make us wonder if Amazon really thinking of its own bank.

It is to be noted that Amazon has announced multiple credit cards such as theAmazon.com Business Credit Card and Amazon Rewards Visa Signature Card. Secondly, based on its lucrative partnership with Synchrony Bank, Amazon plans for a secured credit card for consumers with bad credits. Sounds much like a bank? Yes, it sure does.

If you think Amazon has just ventured into the vertical of producing multiple cards or releasing new credit cards, you are up for a surprise. Amazon has also launched itself in the lending business by launching small business loans, through invitation only,  through its ambitious Amazon Lending business. Additionally, Amazon Pay has come up with a digital wallet for customers and a payments network for retailers and shoppers. This emphatically shows that Amazon is venturing out into the retail sector. 

Lastly, a final attribute of a bank that Amazon, at the moment, arduously follows is a reputation for unmatched customer experience. Given that both banks and Amazon thrive on customer experience and endlessly are on a crusade to talk about delighting customers, it will not be a surprise if Amazon and Bank in the future might be used as synonyms.

Just like you can store money in a bank, consumers can also store money with Amazon Pay. This is because Amazon Cash works at numerous participating stores that include CVS Pharmacy, 7-Eleven, and Boost Mobile.

The origin of Amazon Bank rhetoric

The topic of Amazon in banking isn’t without credit or just mere speculation. The aforementioned reasons lead to the formulation of a strong case in favor of Amazon bank. In addition to all the banking attributes that Amazon is now inculcating in itself, the claim was backed at Fortune magazine’s recent industry conference.

But is Amazon rooting for the same? Amazon Pay’s vice president and general manager Patrick Gauthier believes that even though they can build something doesn’t mean that they should.

But presenting such contentious analogies doesn’t mean that Amazon would not. The Bank of Amazon according to experts can be closely integrated with the Amazon website. In addition, it can also be integrated with Amazon mobile app, with specialized in-person help desks in its Whole Foods stores. This as aforementioned will be due to its recent expansion in the retail sector. 

Many are also of the view that Amazon wouldn’t have much difficulty in venturing out into the domain of car loans. This is more prominent because consumers can already purchase automobiles through Amazon. The cherry on the cake is that in addition to automobiles, auto parts like tires, mufflers, mats, and garage door openers are also available.

Robust consumer base

Talking about Amazon’s consumer base, it would be an understatement to state that Amazon is just a lucrative business. Its colossal 102 million subscribers on Amazon Prime can offer a huge potential customer base for Amazon. Thus, it can be rightfully anticipated that Amazon can provide an opportunity for finance and offer deals to customers with weak credit history in a few simple clicks. A single destination for shopping and finance, who wouldn’t want that? 

Given all the affirmations in favor of the humungous, lucrative Amazon bank rhetoric it is pertinent to ask is the idea feasible? Many experts believe that banking stalwarts must evolve to compete in the banking sector. In fact, one could also effectively argue that banks will need to become more like Amazon.

Given Amazon’s exceptional organizational skills and excellent customer service, which knows all you need to know about how to engage your customers, banks will have to ramp up their technology and presentation. Due to Amazon’s excellent and seamless customer experience, it effectively completes a transaction and suggests new items to buy in seconds, which can be hailed as an effective marketing strategy.

Thus, if traditional banks can offer a similar customer experience to their users and enhance their ability to connect with them through effective communication relationships with managers via secure video or live chat for smaller requests or questions, where customers can obtain personalized service, banks may get a chance to court more customers.

Will Amazon settle with its curtailed freedom?

Again, it is very likely that Amazon Bank will never materialize. However, given the recent developments where BharatPe and Centrum would rescue the significantly distressed PMC bank by way of starting a small finance bank (SFB), Amazon’s entry into the shadow banking space is not an impossibility.

However, entering into the banking services would mean that they’d have to meet national and state banking regulations. So Amazon would want to avoid elaborate regulatory compliances interlaced with red-tapism at any cost. As a matter of fact, banks can effectively end up partnering with Amazon. But why would they do so?

Partnering with Amazon would mean that banks will be able to track what customers spend on mortgages, rent, or healthcare. Given such useful insights, the more it can serve as a clearinghouse for financial products. Additionally, the onus is on traditional banks to meet the challenge and try to work with the eCommerce giant rather than against it.

While some sectors of the industry will undoubtedly suffer, there remains an opportunity for others to thrive by leveraging the advantages of Amazon’s capabilities. Thus it would be interesting to see in what direction the scale will tip, will it be in favor of a robust, lucrative Amazon Bank or will Amazon priorities its freedom of action and operational, subsidiary revenues over others.

 


Tags: Amazon Bank, amazon rewards, amazon pay, amazon cash, amazon prime, amazon prime video

normalize monetary policy

RBI’s Next Big Question: How to Normalize Monetary Policy?

By Economy, Banking, Others No Comments

How to Normalize Monetary Policy?

Global growth is fragile and uneven. Winds of change are blowing across the world again amidst the pandemic. While some economies are attempting to rise from their ashes, others remain in a fiscal fathomless abyss of misery and debt. Throughout the pandemic, India’s central bank has been making crucial decisions for the economy—trading off between inflation and growth. Additionally, on the foreign exchange front, Asia’s third-largest economy has been the largest recipient of foreign portfolio money, or ‘hot money emanating from developed nations.

This is due to the accommodative monetary policies adopted by the developed nations like the US, European Union, and Japan which has led to the increased inflow of FDI in India. What made India a preferred choice of investment and stand out amongst its peers was its macroeconomic stability as well as its investment-grade sovereign credit rating.

If the object of India’s Central Bank is to be scrutinized, the monetary policy committee (MPC) throughout the pandemic has kept it straightforward: don’t rock the boat. It is no news that the second wave of the pandemic has increased the uncertainty around the near-term growth outlook. But given the latest economic numbers, India has been seen recuperating from the pandemic as various indexes indicate growth. Moreover, given India’s falling infection rate, it can be maintained that the economy would not have to impose yet another stringent lockdown to curb the virulent nature of the pandemic, and hence the economy will be given some space to breathe.

The monetary policy framework in India has undergone fundamental modifications. RBI, throughout the pandemic, has kept an accommodative stance prioritizing growth over inflation. But after one successful year of maintaining such a stance, RBI now finds itself in troubled waters as headline inflation looks likely with burgeoning WPI and CPI numbers.

Moreover, the public has already been feeling the pinch of increasing fuel prices and has been demanding its inclusion in the GST regime. However, RBI is of the stance that India is facing transitory inflation which will much likely recede in the future. But given that CPI, for the month of June, was above RBI’s comfort range and the supply constraint persists in the economy due to crippled capacity and partial lockdowns, inflation is doomed to rise.

Moreover, the output gap is still negative and the recovery has not yet been secured, thus growth measures and RBI’s accommodative stance appears to be the right strategy. Thus, RBI at the moment finds itself at the crossroads of difficult choices—to maintain its accommodative stance at record low rates or to end its accommodative stance at a high rate.

The MPC may choose to give fresh time-based guidance, or one or two additional quarters, to stay accommodative, or shift to state-based guidance but an immediate overhaul to control inflation seems highly unlikely. On the other hand, markets seem to prefer the former choice of an accommodative stance, but given the circumstances, the MPC should opt for the latter to give itself maneuverability over the medium-term for various reasons.

First and foremost is the economic stimulus of Rs. 6.28 lakh that has been recently introduced by the government. Given rising inflation in the economy, economic stimulus just adds to the money supply of the economy and hence inflation. Though it is to be noted that the economic stimulus is a replica with some repeated measures of the last stimulus, its impact is too crucial to be ignored.

Secondly, the economic impact of the second wave will be limited, owing to less stringent lockdowns and as consumers and businesses have adapted to the new normal. To support this claim, high-frequency data has suggested that while mobility and passenger transport have been hit, the goods sector continued to chug along. In addition to this, growth should also be supported by medium-term tailwinds from ongoing vaccinations, a synchronized global growth recovery, and lagged effects of easier financial conditions. Hence, while sequential growth may weaken during April-June but growth, at the moment, doesn’t seem like a far-fetched idea as it did previously.

Thirdly, risks to underlying inflation are burgeoning. It is to be noted that near-term inflation moderation is largely due to the volatile vegetable component. Whereas higher freight costs and a broad-based rise in commodity prices have squeezed manufacturers’ profit margins and resulted in some of these costs being passed to consumers. Though the recent WPI and CPI data show that the producer’s cost has not yet been transferred to consumers but it is only a matter of time before it does. Initially, services inflation was subdued, but there is early evidence of higher prices in categories like recreation.

Lastly, the external environment could turn malevolent for emerging markets in the future. This will be due to the US’s growth outperformance given its higher growth rate and robust vaccination campaign. Higher US yields or the Fed’s plan to taper off its asset purchases could trigger capital outflows. Given more enticing returns in the US or any other country, capital flight in India could be triggered.

On the other hand, India, a developing economy, shouldn’t use ambitious and privileged tips from developed countries’ playbooks as in developed economies, central banks are willing to tolerate higher inflation.
Given such a strategy, the near-term versus the medium-term monetary policy strategy differs. What is meant by this is that, while policy continuity could be the correct strategy in the near term, the medium-term or long-term growth-inflation tradeoff argues for gradual policy normalization. This calls for an effective measure to assign a higher weight to inflation, relative to growth.

It goes without saying that besides the standard tools, unconventional measures to address market dislocations were introduced by RBI like asset purchase schemes, opening up of a special liquidity window for the mutual fund industry, regulatory forbearance, loan moratoriums and restructuring of debt significantly eased the pain in the financial sector.

With the pandemic-induced damage to the economy relatively unknown coupled with RBI’s multi-pronged response, credit growth is muted due to concerns over lending risks, and the sovereign bond market is again on tenterhooks.

Thus, RBI which currently faces a conundrum to make a sagacious choice for the economy will be interesting to see which strategy it prioritizes, whether it will be its long-term stabilization program, or will it be its near-term growth strategy program. As clear communication as possible on the speed, timing, and sequencing of the normalization could help guide expectations.

 


Tags: monetary policy, monetary policy normalization, normalize monetary policy, normalization of monetary policy, rbi monetary policy